

Message Text

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PAGE 01 TOKYO 04359 110720 Z

13

ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-09 H-02 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-15 USIA-12

NIC-01 INRE-00 AID-20 EB-11 RSR-01 /114 W
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P R 110621 Z APR 73

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3009

INFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON

USDEL JEC PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 4359

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, JA, VN, VS

SUBJ: JAPAN, NORTH VIETNAM, PRG

SUMMARY: JUST PRIOR TO LEARNING DATES FOR FONOFF DEL' S VISIT TO HANOI (TOKYO 4287) , FONOFF BELIEVED THAT DRV, AWARE OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURE ON GOJ TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH NORTH, WAS USING QTE WAR OF NERVES UNQTE IN ORDER GET MAXIMUM CONCESSIONS FROM GOJ WHEN VISIT ACTUALLY OCCURS. FONOFF FORE-SEES THAT DURING VISIT NORTH VIETNAMESE PRESSURE UPON GOJ WILL FOCUS ON CRITICISM OF GOJ ATTITUDE TOWARD PRG AND GOJ WILLING-NESS ALLOW USE OF US BASES IN JAPAN FOR ONE- FOR- ONE REPLENISH-MENT OF MILITARY SUPPLIES TO GVN. IT APPEARS THAT WHILE GOJ WILL NOT REPEAT NOT CAPITULATE TO DRV DEMAND FOR JAPANESE RECOGNITION OF PRG, WORKING LEVELS IN FONOFF ARE CONSIDERING GESTURES THAT MIGHT BE MADE TOWARD PRG, SUCH AS CHANGE IN PRESENT GOJ POLICY BARRING ENTRY INTO JAPAN OF PRG AFFILIATED REPRESENTATIVES. EMBOFF REITERATED US VIEW THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE AT THIS JUNCTURE WHICH WOULD ENHANCE PRG CLAIM TO LEGITIMACY. END SUMMARY.

1. DAY BEFORE FONOFF LEARNED OF DATES FOR ITS DELEGATION' S VISIT TO HANOI (TOKYO 4287), EMBOFF DISCUSSED VISIT WITH FONOFF 1 ST SEA DIV STAFF OFFICER. OFFICIAL EXPRESSED VIEW THAT DRV IS UNDOUBTEDLY AWARE OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURE ON GOJ TO
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PAGE 02 TOKYO 04359 110720 Z

MAKE PROGRESS IN IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH DRV. HE COMMENTED THAT DRV PROBABLY STALLING ON VISIT IN ORDER TO WAGE QTE WAR OF NERVES UNQTE WITH GOJ IN HOPES OF GAINING GREATER CONCESSIONS FROM GOJ WHEN VISIT ACTUALLY OCCURS. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, HE SAID, BEST POLICY WAS FOR GOJ TO WAIT PATIENTLY. EMBOFF REMARKED THAT STEADY STREAM OF JAPANESE BUSINESSMEN WELCOMED IN HANOI IN RECENT WEEKS PROBABLY REFLECTS HANOI'S AWARENESS OF IMPORTANT ECONOMIC ROLE THAT JAPAN COULD PLAY IN POST WAR PERIOD AND THAT, AS GOJ HAD SOMETHING TO GIVE, IT COULD AFFORD TO DEAL WITH HANOI IN FIRM AND DIGNIFIED MANNER. OFFICIAL WENT ON TO SAY THAT FONOFF EXPECTS THAT, DURING FONOFF DEL'S VISIT, DRV CRITICISM OF GOJ POLICY WILL FOCUS ON GOJ'S ATTITUDE TOWARD PRG AND ON GOJ WILLINGNESS PERMIT USE OF US BASES IN JAPAN FOR ONE- FOR- ONE REPLENISHMENT OF MILITARY SUPPLIES TO GVN. FONOFF IS PREPARING ITS POSITION ON BOTH ISSUES AND IS NOT REPEAT NOT WILLING ACCEDE SHOULD DRV INSIST ON JAPANESE RECOGNITION OF PRG.

3. OFFICIAL WENT ON TO SAY GOJ POLICY OF REFUSING ENTRY TO PRG REPRESENTATIVES WAS BASED UPON WEAK LOGICAL FOUNDATION AND EXPRESSED FEAR THAT IF GOJ RIGIDLY STUCK TO PRESENT POLICY, OPPOSITION PARTIES WOULD FIND NUMEROUS OCCASIONS FOR ATTACKING GOJ POSITION. HE SAID MOST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAVE GRANTED ENTRY PERMITS TO PRG OFFICIALS WITHOUT THEREBY IMPLYING RECOGNITION OF PRG. IF GOJ TOOK SIMILAR APPROACH, OFFICIAL BELIEVES MUCH OPPOSITION CRITICISM WOULD BE DEFUSED. FURTHER, PRESS AND OPPOSITION HAD BEGUN CLAIMING THAT AID TO SVN SHOULD BE CHanneled THROUGH BOTH GVN AND PRG. WHILE PRG CLEARLY INCAPABLE OF RECEIVING AND DISTRIBUTING AID, DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURES IN EFFECT MEANT THAT GOJ WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY SUSTAINING MAJOR AID PROGRAM TO SOUTH VIETNAM IF PART OF FUNDS DID NOT GO TO PRG. THEREFORE REAL CHOICE BEFORE GOJ (AND GVN) WAS BETWEEN SMALL AID PROGRAM, 100 PERCENT OF WHICH WENT TO GVN, AND MUCH LARGER AID PROGRAM, 95 PERCENT OF WHICH WENT TO GVN. OFFICIAL SAID GVN MIGHT FIND ANY CONCESSIONS TO PRG UNACCEPTABLE. GOJ HOWEVER MIGHT BE ABLE TO MAKE MORE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN POLICY TOWARD SOUTH VIETNAM AT SAME TIME WHICH WOULD BE OF REAL BENEFIT TO GVN ALONE, SUCH AS BY AUTHORIZING INVESTMENT GUARANTEES FOR SOUTH VIETNAM.

4. EMBOFF DREW ON STATE 51556 AND 64695 IN REITERATING US
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PAGE 03 TOKYO 04359 110720 Z

SUPPORT FOR GVN AND OPPOSITION TO ANY MOVES WHICH MIGHT

ENHANCE STATUS OR PRESTIGE OF PRG. OFFICIAL COUNTERED THAT SOME GESTURES TOWARD PRG MIGHT ENCOURAGE PRG TO ABIDE BY PARIS AGREEMENT. EMBOFF ARGUED THAT PRG HAD FOUND POST CEASE-FIRE SITUATION LESS FAVORABLE TO ITS INTERESTS THAN HAD BEEN EXPECTED. AS RESULT, PRG HAD APPARENTLY DECIDED TO STALL IN GVN- PRG TALKS IN BELIEF THAT POLITICAL SETTLEMENT UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS COULD NOT BUT REFLECT ITS WEAK POSITION. PRG TACTIC WAS TO STALL IN HOPES THAT THEIR POSITION COULD BE STRENGTHENED OVER TIME BY VARIOUS MEANS INCLUDING INCREASED INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND HUMANITARIAN AID. IN THIS CIRCUMSTANCE, GESTURES TOWARD PRG WOULD ONLY ENCOURAGE PRG TO BELIEVE THAT STALLING TACTICS WOULD SUCCEED.

5. COMMENT: WHILE GOJ POLICY TOWARDS PRG HAS NOT RPT NOT CHANGED AND WHILE GOJ HAS NO RPT NO INTENTION OF RECOGNIZING PRG, CONVERSATION REFLECTS FACT THAT WORKING LEVELS IN FONOFF ARE CASTING GESTURES JAPAN MIGHT MAKE TOWARD PRG TO DEFUSE DOMESTIC CRITICISM AND IN SOME SLIGHT WAY RESPOND TO ANTICIPATED DRV PRESSURE FOR JAPANESE RECOGNITION OF PRG. EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT AUTHORITATIVE BRIEFING ON PRG' S AIMS AND TACTICS IN POST-CEASEFIRE PERIOD COULD HELP PROVIDE GOJ WITH EVIDENCE THAT PRG' S ACTIONS ARE INTENDED TO PREVENT PROGRESS TOWARD POLITICAL SETTLEMENT ENVISAGED IN VIETNAM PEACE AGREEMENT, AND MAKE POINT THAT, AS JAPANESE POLICY IS TO SUPPORT PEACE AGREEMENT, GOJ SHOULD NOT ENCOURAGE SUCH RECALCITRANCE BY GESTURES TOWARD PRG AT THIS TIME, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE BUT NOT NECESSARY FOR BRIEFING TO BE GIVEN IN TIME FOR REPORT TO REACH FONOFF DELEGATION LEADER, MIYAKE, PRIOR TO HIS APRIL 14 DEPARTURE FROM VIENTIANE FOR HANOI. INGERSOLL

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